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On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-17-cv-01049) 
District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 21, 2020 
 
Before: McKEE, BIBAS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 










 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent.  
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McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
Lloyd Industries challenges an allegedly excessive award of damages and 
attorneys’ fees. Because we find there were reasonable grounds for each and that the 
punitive damage award satisfies the constitutional bar, we will affirm.1 
I. 
 We remain “mindful that our scope of review of a damages award is exceedingly 
narrow.”2 Likewise, we review a district court’s award of attorneys’ fees for abuse of 
discretion.3 However, the constitutionality of a punitive damage award is reviewed de 
novo.4  
II. 
Appellant challenges the emotional damages award ($50,000) on the grounds that 
Watson failed to describe sufficient emotional harm to warrant the jury’s award. 
Evidence sufficient to sustain a jury award for such damages does not necessarily have to 
be “compelling,” but it must exist.5 Here there is testimony from Watson and his wife 
that his termination left emotional scars. In particular, there is evidence that the 
unprofessional behavior by Prendergast when informing Watson of his termination 
 
1 The district court held subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This Court 
has appellate jurisdiction over the “final decision” of the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291. 
2 Cooper Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 63 F.3d 262, 277 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(quotation omitted). 
3 Krueger Assoc., Inc. v. Am. Dist. Tel. Co. of Pa., 247 F.3d 61, 69 (3d Cir. 2001). 
4 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (2001). 
5 Bolden v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 21 F.3d 29, 34 (3d Cir. 1994). 
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caused a lasting impact.6 This testimony is sufficient evidence to support the emotional 
damages award.  This is particularly true given our narrow scope of review.  We must 
avoid seconding-guessing the fact-finder. “Evidence of pain and suffering is particularly 
ill-suited to review upon only a written record.”7 
Next, Appellant argues the punitive damage award, at five times the compensatory 
award, was excessive and inadequately supported by the district court’s analysis. We 
must determine “whether the punitive damage award is so ‘grossly disproportional’ to 
[Appellant’s] conduct as to amount to a constitutional violation.”8 Reviewing de novo, we 
find no violation. The ratio between the compensatory ($99,600) and punitive ($500,000) 
damages awarded here is 1:5, a single digit ratio, which falls within the Supreme Court’s 
guidance.9 The argument to the contrary ignores evidence of overtly racial bias that the 
jury found credible.  
Finally, Appellant protests the attorney fee award on the grounds that Watson’s 
counsel never submitted a fee schedule and that the district court awarded a single hourly 
rate for all of that counsel’s services, rather than differentiating between the skilled legal 
work and more mundane tasks that should not command a premium rate. The district 
court did rely on the Community Legal Services fee schedule,10 and we cannot say that 
 
6 App. 395-96. Watson testified that when asked why he had been picked to be laid off, 
Prendergast told him, “because I can.” App. 395. 
7 Walters v. Mintec/Intl., 758 F.2d 73, 81 (3d Cir. 1985) (quotation omitted). 
8 Brand Mktg. Grp. LLC v. Intertek Testing Serv., N.A., Inc., 801 F.3d 347 (3rd Cir. 
2015). 
9 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 410 (2003). 
10 App. 69-80. 
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declining to delineate separate fee rates based on that framework was an abuse of 
discretion. 
 Thus, we will affirm the district court. 
